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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Public Utilities-Separate and. Equal
Accommodations in Motor Busses
In a recent North Carolina case1 the Interracial Commission pe-
titioned the Corporation Commission to make regulations to insure
the negro traveling public separate but equal accommodations on the
busses and in the passenger stations of the respondent bus companies
The petition was dismissed by the Corporation Commission on the
ground that it had no power to interpret carriers by -bus to be com-
mon carriers within the terms of the 1927 statute.2 On appeal to the
Supreme Court it was held, (1) That bus lines operating within the
state are common carriers, and (2) That the Corporation Commission
has plenary power under the 1927 statute to require bus lines operat-
ing between points within the state in carrying passengers for hire to
provide separate bus and station accommodations for white and negro
passengers.3
The legislature has authority to provide reasonable rules and regu-
lations for the supervision of common carriers and to prevent unjust
discriminations and preferences.4 This authority may be delegated
to an administrative board or commission. 5 The Corporation Com-
mission is specifically vested by the 1927 statute6 with power to
'Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, 198 N. C. 317, 151
S. E. 648 (1930).The Corporation Commission was petitioned to make such regulations by
virtue of §7, chapter 136, Public Laws 1927, which provides, "The Commission
is hereby vested with power and authority to supervise and regulate every motor
vehicle carrier under this article; to make or approve the rates, fares, charges,
classifications, rules and regulations for sdrvice and safety of operation and
checking of baggage of each such motor vehicle carrier; to supervise the
operation of union passenger stations in any manner necessary to promote
harmony among the operators and efficiency of service to the traveling public;
... to require the increase of equipment capacity to meet public convenience
and necessity; and to supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers in all other
matters affecting the relationship between such carriers and the traveling and
shipping public. The Commission shall have power and authority, by general
order or otherwise, to prescribe rules and regulations applicable to any and all
motor vehicle carriers. . . ." N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1927) §2613 (p).
' Since this case the Corporation Commission has notified certain bus lines
to make arrangements to provide separate, but equal accommodations, for
whites and negroes in passenger stations. See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily
News, April 30, 1930, page 1, col. 2.
"Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. The Durham & Northern R. R. Co.,
104 N. C. 658, 673, 10 S. E. 659 (1889) ; The Atlantic Express Co. v. The Wil-
mington & Weldon R. R., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R. A. 393, 32 Am.
St. Rep. 805 (1892) ; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.
155, 24 L. ed. 94 (1876).
'The Atlantic Express Co. v. The Wilmington & Weldon R. R., supra
note 4.
'Supra note 2.
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supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers in matters affecting the
relationship between such carriers and the traveling public: It seems
clear from the language of this statute,7 without necessity of con-
struction by the Corporation Commission, that the motor vehicle car-
riers provided for were common carriers. In accord with the policy
of the state with regard to separation of races in public conveyances, 8
the Commission should have issued orders for segregation upon the
petition of the Interracial Commission.
Since the above litigation began, chapter 216, Public Laws of
19299 has gone into effect, but not being necessarily involved in the
case was not thereby construed, although the Court discussed it.1O
The statute provides "that operators of motor vehicles or bus lines
or taxicabs engaged in the transportation of passengers of one race
only shall not be required to provide any accommodations for the
other race." A state statute which requires the separation of the
races, with equal accommodations, is not a denial of equal protection
of the laws.1 1 But no one can be excluded by a common carrier on
account of color,' 2 and a state law which authorizes race discrimina-
'The definition of terms provided by the same act defines, "the term 'motor
vehicle carrier' means every corporation or person * * * owning, controlling,
operating: or managing any motor vehicle used in the business of transporting
persons or property for compensation between cities, or between towns, or
between cities and towns over the public highways of the state as public high-
ways are defined herein." Also "the term 'service' means that motor vehicle
service which is held out to the public and of which the public may avail itself
at will for transportation over the public highways * * * irrespective of
whether the service is on regular schedule or otherwise." Section 1, Chapter
136, Public Laws 1927; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1927) §2613 (j).
' "The policy of the legislative branch of the government is to have separa-
tion of the races-in the railroads, street cars, schools, public institutions, etc.,
of the state-with equal accommodations." State v. Williams, 186 N. C. 627,
634, 120 S. E. 224 (1923).
'N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1929 Supp.) §2613 (p), amending §7, Chapter
136, Public Laws 1927, and N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§3494, 3497.
" The Court said of the 1929 statute, "We think this act also authorizes
the Corporation Commission to work out in good faith the manner and method
left to the sound discretion of the Commission-a sane and sensible solution
giving adequate and equal accommodation to the white and negro races, taking
into consideration all matters including economical conditions relative to a
workable solution." Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, supra
note 1, at p..320.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. ed. 256 (1896);
Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup. Ct. 667, 54 L. ed.
936 (1910).
' Coger v. North West Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873) ; Meisner v.
Detroit, B. I. &_W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N. W. 14, 129 Am. St. Rep.
493 (1908) ; West Chester & Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 93
Am. Dec. 744 (1867). "The law imposes on the carrier the duty of transport-
ing every citizen paying the fare demanded. This right of the citizen and duty
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tion by a public carrier of passengers is unconstitutional. 13 It is sub-
mitted therefore that the portion of the 1929 statute above set out is
contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
-ment.1
4
The statute also provides "that nothing contained in this act or the
law amended hereby shall be construed to declare operators of busses
:and/or taxicabs common carriers." This provision appears to be
superfluous. Whether a carrier is private or public depends upon the
service it renders and not on legislation.1 5 Whether the service ren-
-dered is public or private depends on the facts, and the fourteenth
amendment prevents the legislature from declaring a carrier private
or public unless there is a reasonable basis of fact for so doing.'
A. W. GirOLsoN, JR.
Contracts-Consideration-Family Settlement
The testator, in disposing of his property among his children,
-made special bequests to two of his daughters, in recognition of their
love and attention to himself and their mother. From statements
-made by the eldest son, an executor under the will, the children drew
the inference that the two daughters had, and would enforce, a valid
claim for wages against the estate, unless they were paid. To avoid
litigation an agreement was drawn up, and signed and sealed by the
children, whereby the two daughters were to receive $1,500 each in
addition to the special bequests provided in the will and the unsigned
and undated codicil. The children now seek to have the agreement
set aside on the ground of lack of consideration. Held, that a court
of equity looks with favor upon family settlements, and if asserted in
of the carrier exists by common law." U. S. v. Dodge, Fed. Cas. No. 14,976
(W. D. Texas 1877).
"McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup.
Ct. 69, 59 L. ed. 169 (1914).
'See (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rv. 391-392.
"Waldum v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry. Co., 169 Wis. 137,
170 N. W. 729 (1919) ; State v. Public Service Com., 117 Wash. 453, 201 Pac.
765 (1921) ; Pacific Spruce Corp. v. McCoy, 294 Fed. 711 (D. C. Ore. 1923) ;
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col., 241 U. S. 252, 36 Sup: Ct. 583, 60
L. ed. 984, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 765 (1916).
"Frost v. R. R. Com. of Cal., 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. ed. 1101
(1926); Michigan Public Utilities Com. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct.
191, 69 L. ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 1105 (1925). The state may declare a cor-
poration a common carrier upon the application of the corporation, Corpor-
ation Commission v. Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co., 187 N. C. 424, 121 S. E. 767(1924).
